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REMARKS OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
ROBERT M. GATES
Delivered to the Navy League Sea-Air-Space Expo, Gaylord Convention
Center, National Harbor, Maryland, on 3 May 2010
The topic of this year’s exposition is “Responding Globally: Engaged at Seaand Ashore.” Considering our military’s unprecedented level of global en-
gagement—especially the sea services—I cannot think of a better subject.
The pattern of engagement is reflected in a range of activities around the
world that would no doubt leave Alfred Thayer Mahan spinning in his grave:
building partnership capacity through the Africa Partnership Station in the Gulf
of Guinea; training with friends and allies to secure vital shipping lanes in
Southeast Asia; digging wells and building schools in Djibouti; leading multina-
tional efforts to counter the scourge of piracy around the Horn of Africa; dis-
patching hospital ships to treat the poor and destitute; helping with crises like
the oil spill along the Gulf Coast; and responding to natural disasters, most re-
cently in Haiti—efforts that demonstrate our service members’ incredible com-
passion and decency.
Then there are the wars. With roughly twenty-five ships—and more than
twenty thousand sailors—in the CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] area of
operations, there is no doubt that this is a navy at war. Every time I visit Iraq or
Afghanistan, I am struck by the number of sailors on the ground—one of the
great unappreciated stories of the last few years. Tens of thousands of sailors
have been to theater—including officers commanding provincial reconstruc-
tion teams, finance clerks, riverine crews, engineers, the SEALs and the corps-
men, and our “devil docs.” These men and women are vital to the mission and
helping to ease the strain on our ground forces—and doing so without fail and
without complaint.
And then, of course, there is the role of the Marine Corps, whose impact has
been a game-changer: first in Anbar Province, key to the turnaround in Iraq, and
now in southern Afghanistan, the center of gravity in that war. In March, I had a
chance to meet with Marines at the tip of the spear in a town called Now Zad—a
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place that had been, for nearly four years, a ghost town under the jackboot of the
Taliban. Then came a battalion of Marines, who, after months of hard work and
sacrifice, have slowly brought the town back to life—creating a model for opera-
tions elsewhere.
For years now, the Corps has been acting as essentially a second land army. As
General [James T.] Conway [Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps] has noted, there
are young, battle-hardened Marines with multiple combat tours who have spent
little time inside of a ship, much less practicing hitting a beach. Their critical
work well inland will be necessary for the foreseeable future.
Many of the tasks and roles I’ve just mentioned would have been unthinkable
as recently as a decade ago and are with our sea services to stay. But we must al-
ways be mindful of why America built and maintained a Navy, Marine Corps,
and Coast Guard in the first place. Indeed, it was an Army general, Ulysses S.
Grant, who said that “money expended in a fine navy, not only adds to our secu-
rity and tends to prevent war in the future, but is very material aid to our com-
merce with foreign nations in the meantime.” In fact, this country learned early
on, after years of being bullied and blackmailed on the high seas, that it must be
able to protect trade routes, project power, deter potential adversaries, and, if
necessary, strike them on the oceans, in their ports, or on their shores. We cannot
allow these core capabilities and skill sets to atrophy through distraction or
neglect.
This is even more important considering that, with America’s ground forces
dedicated to the campaigns in the Middle East and Central Asia, the weight of
America’s deterrent and strategic military strength has shifted to our air and na-
val forces. So in the next few minutes I’d like to offer some perspective on the
challenges facing America’s sea services as they strive to field and fund the capa-
bilities our nation will need for the decades ahead—focusing on three central
questions:
• What kind of qualities should the maritime services encourage in a new
generation of leaders?
• What new capabilities will our Navy–Marine Corps team need, and which
ones will potentially be made obsolete?
• How can we be sure that our procurement plans are cost-effective, efficient,
and realistic?
As a starting point, given the complex security challenges America faces
around the globe, the future of our maritime services will ultimately depend less
on the quality of their hardware than on the quality of their leaders. I addressed
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this question to the midshipmen at the Naval Academy a month ago by citing
some of the towering figures from our sea services. Leaders like:
• Lieutenant General Victor Krulak, the visionary behind the Higgins boat
who later contributed greatly to our understanding of counterinsurgency in
Vietnam;
• Admiral Chester Nimitz, who as a young officer helped develop the circular
formation for carrier escorts, used to great effect in World War II and for
decades afterward;
• Admiral Hyman Rickover, whose genius and persistence overcame the con-
ventional wisdom that nuclear reactors were too bulky and dangerous to
put on submarines; and
• Finally, Roy Boehm, who after World War II designed and led a special new
commando unit that became the Navy SEALs. Boehm’s legacy is at work ev-
ery night, tracking down our country’s most lethal enemies in Afghanistan
and elsewhere around the world.
The reason I wanted to talk to midshipmen about these leaders—and why I
am citing them today—is not that they were always right. Nor that they should
be emulated in every way—to put it mildly. What is compelling about each of
these leaders is that they had the vision and insight to see that the world and
technology were changing, they understood the implications of these shifts, and
then they pressed ahead in the face of often fierce institutional resistance.
The qualities these legends embody have been important and decisive
throughout the history of warfare. But I would contend that they are more nec-
essary than ever in the first decades of this century, given the pace of technologi-
cal changes, and the agile and adaptive nature of our most likely and lethal
adversaries—from modern militaries using asymmetric tactics to terrorist
groups with advanced weapons. Our officers will lead an American military that
must have the maximum flexibility to deal with the widest possible range of
scenarios and adversaries.
Second, in order to be successful, the sea services must have the right makeup
and capabilities. Surveying our current force, it is useful to start with some per-
spective—especially since the Navy, of all the services, has been the most consis-
tently concerned about its size, as measured by the total number of ships in the
fleet.
It is important to remember that, as much as the U.S. battle fleet has shrunk
since the end of the Cold War, the rest of the world’s navies have shrunk even
more. So, in relative terms, the U.S. Navy is as strong as it has ever been.
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In assessing risks and requirements even in light of an expanding array of
global missions and responsibilities—everything from shows of presence to hu-
manitarian relief—some context is useful:
• The U.S. operates eleven large carriers, all nuclear powered. In terms of size
and striking power, no other country has even one comparable ship.
• The U.S. Navy has ten large-deck amphibious ships that can operate as sea
bases for helicopters and vertical-takeoff jets. No other navy has more than
three, and all of those navies belong to allies or friends. Our Navy can carry
twice as many aircraft at sea as the rest of the world combined.
• The U.S. has fifty-seven nuclear-powered attack and cruise missile subma-
rines—again, more than the rest of the world combined.
• Seventy-nine Aegis-equipped combatants carry roughly eight thousand
vertical-launch missile cells. In terms of total missile firepower, the U.S. ar-
guably outmatches the next twenty largest navies.
• All told, the displacement of the U.S. battle fleet—a proxy for overall fleet
capabilities—exceeds, by one recent estimate, at least the next thirteen na-
vies combined, of which eleven are our allies or partners.
• And, at 202,000 strong, the U.S. Marine Corps is the largest military force
of its kind—exceeding the size of most world armies.
Still, even as the United States stands unsurpassed on, above, and below the
high seas, we have to prepare for the future. As in previous eras, new centers of
power—with new wealth, military strength, and ambitions on the world
stage—are altering the strategic landscape. If history shows anything, it’s that we
cannot predict or guarantee the course of a nation decades from now—the time
it takes to develop and build the next generation of ships, a process that has been
likened to building a medieval cathedral: brick by brick, window by window,
over decades.
Our Navy has to be designed for new challenges, new technologies, and new
missions—because another one of history’s hard lessons is that, when it comes
to military capabilities, those who fail to adapt often fail to survive. In World
War II, both the American and British navies were surprised by the speed with
which naval airpower made battleships obsolete. Because of two decades of test-
ing and operations, however, both were well prepared to shift to carrier opera-
tions. We have to consider whether a similar revolution at sea is under way today.
Potential adversaries are well aware of our overwhelming conventional ad-
vantage—which is why, despite significant naval modernization programs un-
der way in some countries, no one intends to bankrupt themselves by
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challenging the U.S. to a shipbuilding competition akin to the dreadnought race
prior to World War I.
Instead, potential adversaries are investing in weapons designed to neutralize
U.S. advantages—to deny our military freedom of action while potentially
threatening America’s primary means of projecting power: our bases, sea and air
assets, and the networks that support them.
We know other nations are working on asymmetric ways to thwart the reach
and striking power of the U.S. battle fleet. At the low end, Hezbollah, a nonstate
actor, used antiship missiles against Israel’s navy in 2006. And Iran is combining
ballistic and cruise missiles, antiship missiles, mines, and swarming speedboats
in order to challenge our naval power in that region.
At the higher end of the access-denial spectrum, the virtual monopoly the
U.S. has enjoyed with precision-guided weapons is eroding—especially with
long-range, accurate antiship cruise and ballistic missiles that can potentially
strike from over the horizon. This is a particular concern with aircraft carriers
and other large, multibillion-dollar, blue-water surface combatants, where, for
example, a Ford-class carrier plus its full complement of the latest aircraft would
represent potentially $15 to $20 billion worth of hardware at risk. The U.S. will
also face increasingly sophisticated underwater combat systems—including
numbers of stealthy subs—all of which could end the operational sanctuary our
Navy has enjoyed in the western Pacific for the better part of six decades.
One part of the way ahead is through more innovative strategies and joint ap-
proaches. The agreement by the Navy and Air Force to work together on an
Air-Sea Battle concept is an encouraging development, which has the potential
to do for America’s military deterrent power at the beginning of the twenty-first
century what AirLand Battle did near the end of the twentieth.
But we must also rethink what and how we buy—to shift investments toward
systems that provide the ability to see and strike deep along the full spectrum of
conflict. This means, among other things:
• Extending the range at which U.S. naval forces can fight, refuel, and strike,
with more resources devoted to long-range unmanned aircraft and intelli-
gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.
• New sea-based missile defenses.
• A submarine force with expanded roles that is prepared to conduct more
missions deep inside an enemy’s battle network. We will also have to in-
crease submarine strike capability and look at smaller and unmanned un-
derwater platforms.
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These changes are occurring even as the Navy is called on to do more missions
that fall on the low end of the conflict spectrum—a requirement that will not go
away, as the new naval operational concept reflects. Whether the mission is
counterinsurgency, piracy, or security assistance, among others, new missions
have required new ways of thinking about the portfolio of weapons we buy. In
particular, the Navy will need numbers, speed, and the ability to operate in shal-
low water, especially as the nature of war in the twenty-first century pushes us
toward smaller, more diffuse weapons and units that increasingly rely on a series
of networks to wage war. As we learned last year, you don’t necessarily need a billion-
dollar guided-missile destroyer to chase down and deal with a bunch of teenage
pirates wielding AK-47s and RPGs [rocket-propelled grenades].
The Navy has responded with investments in more special warfare capabili-
ties, small patrol coastal vessels, a riverine squadron, and joint high-speed ves-
sels. Last year’s budget accelerated the buy of the Littoral Combat Ship [LCS],
which, despite its development problems, is a versatile ship that can be produced
in quantity and go places that are either too shallow or too dangerous for the
Navy’s big, blue-water surface combatants. The new approach to LCS procure-
ment and competition should provide an affordable, scalable, and sustainable
path to producing the quantity of ships we need.
There has been some talk that the rebalancing effort of the last couple of
years—where resources and institutional support have shifted toward what is
needed in the current conflicts and other irregular scenarios—has skewed prior-
ities too far away from high-tech conventional capabilities. In reality, in this fis-
cal year the Department requested nearly $190 billion for total procurement,
research, and development—an almost 90 percent increase over the last decade.
At most, 10 percent of that $190 billion is dedicated exclusively to equipment
optimized for counterinsurgency, security assistance, humanitarian operations,
or other so-called low-end capabilities. In these last two budget cycles, I have di-
rected a needed and noticeable shift—but hardly a dramatic one, especially in
light of the significant naval overmatch that I described earlier.
These issues invariably bring up debates over so-called gaps between stated
requirements and current platforms—be they ships, aircraft, or anything else.
More often than not, the solution offered is either more of what we already have
or modernized versions of preexisting capabilities. This approach ignores the
fact that we face diverse adversaries with finite resources that consequently force
them to come at the U.S. in unconventional and innovative ways. The more rele-
vant gap we risk creating is one between the capabilities we are pursuing and
those that are actually needed in the real world of tomorrow.
Considering that, the Department must continually adjust its future plans as
the strategic environment evolves. Two major examples come to mind.
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First, what kind of new platform is needed to get large numbers of troops
from ship to shore under fire—in other words, the capability provided by the
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. No doubt, it was a real strategic asset during the
first Gulf War to have a flotilla of Marines waiting off Kuwait City—forcing
Saddam’s army to keep one eye on the Saudi border, and one eye on the coast.
But we have to take a hard look at where it would be necessary or sensible to
launch another major amphibious landing again—especially as advances in
antiship systems keep pushing the potential launch point further from shore.
On a more basic level, in the twenty-first century, what kind of amphibious ca-
pability do we really need to deal with the most likely scenarios, and then how
much?
Second—aircraft carriers. Our current plan is to have eleven carrier strike
groups through 2040. To be sure, the need to project power across the oceans
will never go away. But, consider the massive overmatch the U.S. already enjoys.
Consider, too, the growing antiship capabilities of adversaries. Do we really need
eleven carrier strike groups for another thirty years when no other country has
more than one? Any future plans must address these realities.
And that brings me to the third issue: the budget. I have in the past warned
about our nation’s tendency to disarm in the wake of major wars. That remains a
concern. But, as has always been the case, defense budget expectations over time,
not to mention any country’s strategic strength, are intrinsically linked to the
overall financial and fiscal health of the nation.
And in that respect, we have to accept some hard fiscal realities. American
taxpayers and the Congress are rightfully worried about the deficit. At the same
time, the Department of Defense’s track record as a steward of taxpayer dollars
leaves much to be desired.
Now, I know that part of the problem lies outside the Defense Depart-
ment—and it has been this way for a long time. One of my favorite stories is
about Henry Knox, the first secretary of war. He was charged with building the
first American fleet. To get the necessary support from the Congress, Knox even-
tually ended up with six frigates being built in six different shipyards in six dif-
ferent states.
In this year’s budget submission, the Department has asked to end funding
for an extra engine for the Joint Strike Fighter as well as to cease production of
the C-17 cargo aircraft—two decisions supported by the services and reams of
analysis. As we speak, a fight is on to keep the Congress from putting the extra
engine and more C-17s back in the budget—at an unnecessary potential cost to
the taxpayers of billions of dollars over the next few years. The issues surround-
ing political will and the Defense budget are ones I will discuss in more detail at
the Eisenhower Library on Saturday [8 May 2010].
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None of that, however, absolves the Pentagon and the services from
responsibility with regard to procurement. These issues are especially acute when
it comes to big-ticket items whose costs skyrocket far beyond initial estimates.
Current submarines and amphibious ships are three times as expensive as their
equivalents during the 1980s—this in the context of an overall shipbuilding and
conversion budget that is 20 percent less. Just a few years ago, the Congressional
Budget Office projected that meeting the Navy’s shipbuilding plan would cost
more than $20 billion per year—double the shipbuilding budget of recent years,
and a projection that was underfunded by some 30 percent. It is reasonable to
wonder whether the nation is getting a commensurate increase in capability in
exchange for these spiraling costs.
The Navy’s DDG-1000 is a case in point. By the time the Navy leadership cur-
tailed the program, the price of each ship had more than doubled and the pro-
jected fleet had dwindled from thirty-two to seven. The programmed buy is now
three.
Or consider plans for a new ballistic-missile submarine, the SSBN(X). Right
now, the Department proposes spending $6 billion in research and development
over the next few years—for a projected buy of twelve subs at $7 billion apiece.
Current requirements call for a submarine with the size and payload of a boom-
er—and the stealth of an attack sub. In a congressional hearing earlier this year, I
pointed out that in the later part of this decade the new ballistic-missile subma-
rine alone would begin to eat up the lion’s share of the Navy’s shipbuilding
resources.
To be sure, the most recent thirty-year shipbuilding plan is a step in the right
direction. Secretary [of the Navy Ray] Mabus and Admiral [Gary] Roughead
[Chief of Naval Operations] have worked hard to create reasonable budgets and
reset the service “in stride” to reduce operational disruptions. At the same time,
the Navy’s innovative energy security and independence initiative not only helps
the environment, but also will save money in the long term.
Even so, it is important to remember that, as the wars recede, money will be
required to reset the Army and Marine Corps, which have borne the brunt of the
conflicts. And there will continue to be long-term—and inviolable—costs asso-
ciated with taking care of our troops and their families. In other words, I do not
foresee any significant top-line increases in the shipbuilding budget beyond
current assumptions. At the end of the day, we have to ask whether the nation
can really afford a Navy that relies on $3 to $6 billion destroyers, $7 billion sub-
marines, and $11 billion carriers.
Though I have addressed a number of topics today, I should add that I don’t
pretend to have all the answers. But, mark my words, the Navy and Marine Corps
must be willing to reexamine and question basic assumptions in light of
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evolving technologies, new threats, and budget realities. We simply cannot af-
ford to perpetuate a status quo that heaps more and more expensive technolo-
gies onto fewer and fewer platforms—thereby risking a situation where some of
our greatest capital expenditures go toward weapons and ships that could poten-
tially become wasting assets.
A concluding thought. The number and kind of ships we have—and how we
use them—will be ever changing, as they have for the last two hundred–plus
years. What must be unchanging, what must be enduring, is the quality of the
sailors and Marines on board these ships and serving ashore. They must have
moral as well as physical courage; they must have integrity; they must think cre-
atively and boldly. They must have the vision and insight to see that the world
and technology are constantly changing and that the Navy and Marine Corps
must therefore change with the times—ever flexible and ever adaptable. They
must be willing to speak hard truths, including to superiors—as did their leg-
endary predecessors.
Over the past three and a half years, in the fury of two wars, I have seen the fu-
ture of the Navy and Marine Corps on board ships, on the ground in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan, at Navy bases and Marine camps, and at the [U.S. Naval] Academy.
These young men and women fill me with confidence that the future of our sea
services is incredibly bright and that our nation will be secure in their hands.
Thank you.
DR. ROBERT M. GATES
Dr. Gates was sworn in on 18December 2006 as the twenty-second Secretary of Defense.
A text of the speech given at the Eisenhower Library on 8May 2010, mentioned in these
remarks, is available at www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1467.
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